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The Practice of Law as  
Christian Discipleship 
Nathan S. Chapman* 
 
Abstract 
 
“Can the ordinary practice of law be a religious calling?”  In a 
number of scholarly books and articles, as a teacher, and as a men-
tor, Robert Cochran has answered this question with a resounding 
“yes.”  This Essay, part of a festschrift published in Bob’s honor by 
the Pepperdine Law Review, engages with his work to propose a 
framework of Christian ethics for reconceiving the practice of law 
as a form of Christian discipleship.  It argues that Christians should 
understand the practice of law as participation in government-as-
judgment, participation that is always fraught with the risks of de-
ceit, injustice, and abuse of power.  Christians can nevertheless ex-
ercise the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love as they partic-
ipate in judgment, while trusting that their participation may 
facilitate those virtues’ further development. 
 
 * Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  Thanks to Bob Cochran and John 
Inazu for commenting on prior drafts of this Essay.  Thanks also to the participants at a 2018 workshop 
at Pepperdine Caruso School of Law sponsored by the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on Law, 
Religion, and Ethics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes you see a glimmer through the woods.  A torch flickering, a 
sign of life, a summons even.  Bob Cochran’s work and friendship have en-
couraged me along a path of thinking, teaching, and writing about religion and 
law.  In particular, Bob has been at the vanguard of writing, teaching, and 
facilitating discussion about an important question: “Can the ordinary practice 
of law be a religious calling?”1  Bob’s writing and, more importantly, his life 
have answered with a resounding “yes.”  From within the Christian tradition, 
Bob has illustrated that Christ might call and fruitfully use his followers as 
practitioners and teachers of the law. 
I would like to outline a framework for a theological ethics of lawyering 
inspired by Bob’s work.  The framework has broader implications for a theo-
logical ethics of citizenship that I hope to pursue in further research.  Like 
Bob, I am interested less in ethical casuistry and more in Christian disciple-
ship.  To that end, the framework is pastoral.  My purpose is to encourage 
Christians who practice law, or, more broadly, those who participate as citi-
zens in a democratic republic, as they do so, to become more like Christ. 
II. GOVERNMENT AS JUDGMENT 
To begin with, I suggest that we orient the practice of law around a theo-
logical account of human government.  Practicing law is a unique form of 
participating in government.  My own view is that human government is best 
 
1. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Introduction: Can the Ordinary Practice of Law Be a Religious Call-
ing?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373 (2005) [hereinafter Cochran, Religious Calling]; see also LAWYERS, 
CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 
2009); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Jesus, Agape, and Law, in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW: HOW MIGHT 
CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW? 13 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Zachary R. Calo eds., 2017) [herein-
after Cochran, Jesus, Agape, and Law]; Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Dallas Willard, The Kingdom of 
God, Law, and the Heart: Jesus and the Civil Law, in LAW AND THE BIBLE: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 151 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & David VanDrunen eds., 2013).  See generally 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court Justices: A Theological Analysis, 
4 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 296 (2006); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Christian Traditions, Culture, and 
Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 242 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. 
Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues: A 
Review Essay of Mary Ann Glendon’s A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Pro-
fession is Transforming American Society and Anthony T. Kronman’s The Lost Lawyer: Failing 
Ideals of the Legal Profession, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707 (1996) [hereinafter Cochran, Lawyers 
and Virtues] (commending Mary Ann Glendon and Anthony T. Kronman on their thoughtful in-
sight into the legal profession and their focus on character and virtues). 
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understood, theologically, as a temporary institution, resulting from the hu-
man rejection of God’s rule, which God nevertheless uses to contain and pun-
ish human wrongdoing. 
This account of human government is within the mainstream of western 
Christian political theology.2  The Apostle Paul told a group of Roman Chris-
tians that God had ordained the government to punish wrongdoing.3  The gov-
ernment was God’s “servant” for the good of society.  There is a straight line 
from this understanding of human government in western Christian thought 
from Paul, to Augustine, to John Calvin, to many theologians of our own day.4 
Oliver O’Donovan, in particular, has argued that God’s purpose for the 
government is captured by the concept of “judgment.”5  This is not to restrict 
the government’s sphere to the work that courts do—to issuing judgments in 
particular cases.  Rather, O’Donovan argues that the government’s operations, 
whether defining crimes, distributing licenses, or defending the public, should 
be evaluated in light of the government’s ultimate responsibility to define, 
prevent, and punish wrongdoing.6  What is “wrong” depends on local context 
alongside universal norms.7  For now, I will adopt this theological notion of 
government as principally concerned with judgment.8 
I think it is necessary to add something that complicates the mainstream 
picture.  The New Testament does not give a clear vision of whether, and how, 
a follower of Jesus ought to participate in governmental judgment.  Christ told 
his followers to give to Caesar what was his, but he did not tell them what 
 
 2. See, e.g., The Government and the Sword, LIGONIER MINISTRIES: LIGONIER BLOG, https:// 
www.ligonier.org/learn/devotionals/government-and-sword/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (“As a gen-
eral rule, earthly governments punish wrongdoing.”). 
 3. See Romans 13:1–7 (New American Standard Version) (“Every person is to be in subjection 
to the governing authorities.  For there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are 
established by God. . . .  But if you do what is evil, be afraid; for [the government] does not bear the 
sword for nothing.”). 
 4. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 634–93 (R.W. Dyson ed. & 
trans., 1998); JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 650–76 (Henry Beveridge 
trans., 1989); ERIC GREGORY, POLITICS & THE ORDER OF LOVE: AN AUGUSTINIAN ETHIC OF 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (2008); 2 ROBERT W. JENSON, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: THE WORKS OF 
GOD 76 (1999); CHARLES T. MATHEWES, A THEOLOGY OF PUBLIC LIFE 180–83 (2007). 
 5. OLIVER O’DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT 3 (2005). 
 6. Id. at 57–58. 
 7. See JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (2d ed. 1994). 
 8. For now, I will leave open the possibility that the government should also affect “justice,” 
understood as a more robust form of individual right.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: 
RIGHTS AND WRONGS 12–13 (2008). 
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belonged to Caesar.  The New Testament makes it plain that followers of 
Christ are to forsake their own rights, to turn the other cheek, to lay down their 
lives.9  Yet participating in judgment entails enforcing rights, punishing 
wrongdoers, and, sometimes, taking lives.10  This would seem to put Chris-
tians who participate in the exercise of judgment in something of a bind: they 
are called to do something for others they are forbidden to do for themselves.11 
Christians have sought to resolve this tension in a variety of ways.  Some 
eschew governmental participation.12  As Cochran has noted, the classic jus-
tification for Christian participation in government points back to Jesus’s ethic 
of love: sometimes love requires wielding the sword on behalf of the commu-
nity to protect victims.13  Paul tells the Christians in Rome to “never avenge 
[themselves]”14 but simultaneously makes it clear that God institutes and uses 
“the governing authorities”15 “to execute wrath on the wrongdoer.”16  Perhaps 
this makes a space for Christians to forgo vengeance against their personal 
enemies, yet to serve as God’s instruments of vengeance against “wrong-
doer[s].”17  As Cochran has put it, “[u]nder Jesus’ teaching, the mindset is the 
same in each setting—the Christian should seek the good of other people, both 
enemies and victims.”18 
Whether this logic resolves or restates the dilemma is open to debate.  If 
loving a victim requires executing vengeance, why not when the victim is 
oneself?  Such a neat division of personal and political vengeance may call 
for a form of role morality that tests the limits of psychological coherence. 
The tension may be felt especially keenly by Christians in a democratic 
republic.19  For them, discipleship and citizenship are fully democratized.  Put 
plainly, they are called to be faithful Christians and good citizens.  Without 
attempting to resolve this problem, it is sufficient at this point to note that in 
a democratic republic, all those with political rights and responsibilities, such 
 
 9. Matthew 5:39–40; John 15:13; 1 Corinthians 6:1–9. 
 10. Cochran, Religious Calling, supra note 1, at 380. 
 11. Cochran, Jesus, Agape, and Law, supra note 1, at 34. 
 12. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
(2016); YODER, supra note 7, at 207–09. 
 13. O’DONOVAN, supra note 5, at 85–87. 
 14. Romans 12:19. 
 15. Id. at 13:1. 
 16. Id. at 13:4. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Cochran, Jesus, Agape, and Law, supra note 1, at 35. 
 19. Id. at 34. 
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as the rights and responsibilities of voting and jury service, participate to some 
extent in the exercise of judgment.  Lawyers do so extensively, and on a daily 
basis. 
III. THE VIRTUES OF JUDGMENT 
Having reoriented the practice of law as a form of participating in judg-
ment, we are in a better position to understand it as a vocation.  I want to 
argue, in the first place, that Christians should practice law as anyone else 
should, through the development and exercise of the virtues of practical judg-
ment, truthfulness, and mercy.  All lawyers should prioritize the development 
of these virtues and should develop them to a higher degree than those who 
participate in judgment only occasionally.  These virtues are not unique to 
Christians, so I will not spend a great deal of time on them. 
Briefly, then: by practical judgment I mean roughly what virtue ethicists 
mean by phronesis—the ability to choose good ends and the best way to 
achieve them.20  A lawyer with practical judgment can identify the nature of 
a client’s problem, and choose the best way to solve it from among the options 
on offer.  Good lawyers know that clients come to them with problems, not 
necessarily “legal issues.”  Whether they give rise to legal questions, or some 
other sort of question, or both, is the lawyer’s job to sort out.  Litigation, in all 
its forms, is only one tool in the lawyer’s problem-solving toolkit.  Practical 
judgment is the ability to accurately assess which tool to use, and when.21 
By truthfulness I mean the virtues of accuracy and sincerity.22  Lawyers 
should develop and exercise the capacities to describe facts and law accurately 
and to speak sincerely.23  This goes beyond the duties of candor required by 
ordinary “professional responsibility.”24  The virtue of accuracy must include 
 
 20. See 2 ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 
1799–1800 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984); see also ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN 
MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984). 
 21. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 192 (2003); Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2271 
(2001); Cochran, Lawyers and Virtues, supra note 1, at 715–21. 
 22. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 123, 172 (2004) (discussing 
important attributes of truth and truthfulness and expanding on what accuracy and sincerity mean in 
this context). 
 23. See generally Cochran, Lawyers and Virtues, supra note 1, at 717 (discussing the skills re-
quired in the study and practice of law). 
 24. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of 
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV. 281, 284 (1979) (clarifying the three stated 
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the ability to identify when the law does not measure up to the community’s 
moral norms, or to its stated purposes.25  Wrongdoing, and the government’s 
proper response to it, is inherently local, and lawyers should be attuned to this.  
As a concrete example, consider the disparate punishment for possession and 
sale of crack cocaine that was long baked into federal criminal law.  Lawyers 
are better positioned than others, by virtue of training, habit, and proximity, 
to recognize that such punishment does not reflect the norms used to justify 
it. 
Mercy is a concept that requires a bit more unpacking.26  By mercy we 
might mean (1) equity; (2) compassion; or (3) forgiveness, understood as the 
free cancelation of moral debt.  Theologians disagree about whether the gov-
ernment can or ought to engage in forgiveness,27 so for now I want to put that 
to the side and focus on equity and compassion. 
Equity, as I am using it, means moderating a strict application of a general 
rule to account for the unique facts of a case.28  For instance, taking into ac-
count mitigating factors during sentencing.29  This form of “mercy,” such as 
it is, is probably best understood as an aspect of accurate judgment.30 
Mercy-as-compassion, however, bears a closer resemblance to the mercy 
in the command of the prophet Micah to “act justly, . . . love mercy, 
and . . . walk humbly with . . . God.”31  Such mercy is empathy for those sub-
ject to judgment.32  They are not social outcasts, cogs in the wheels of justice, 
or means to an end.  They are the object not only of judgment, but of God’s 
 
standards in the Code). 
 25. See, e.g., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 89–90 (noting 
that, in the novel To Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus Finch was not truthful about Bob Ewell’s death be-
cause he was protecting Boo Radley from public notice; Finch believed he was “protecting the weak”). 
 26. See generally LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 71 (defining 
mercy’s defining aims as “care, concern, and contribution to the positive development and flourishing 
of others”). 
 27. Compare John Inazu, No Future Without (Personal) Forgiveness: Reexamining the Role of 
Forgiveness in Transitional Justice, 10 HUM. RIGHTS REV. 316, 317 (2009) (finding that the govern-
ment may forgive wrongdoers because wrongdoers cause public injuries), with Martha Minow, For-
giveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1615, 1628–29 (2015). 
 28. See Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“The recourse to principals of justice 
to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances.”). 
 29. William Perkins, A Treatise of Christian Equitie, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A 
SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 100–1625, 771, 772–77 (Oliver O’Donovan & Joan 
Lockwood O’Donovan eds., 1999). 
 30. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 5–7 (1986). 
 31. Micah 6:8 (New International Version). 
 32. See Michael Welker, The Power of Mercy in Biblical Law, 19 J.L. & REL. 225, 230–33 (2014). 
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eternal love.  Such a virtue of mercy is available to all lawyers, regardless 
their religious tradition, but it has special valence for those who know the God 
of Jesus Christ. 
IV. JUDGMENT AND FAITH, HOPE, AND LOVE 
We are now in a position to discuss the relationship between the spiritual 
virtues of faith, hope, and love, and the practice of law.  This will pave the 
way for a reflection on the practice of law as a form of discipleship. 
I take it for granted that the development and exercise of the theological 
virtues of faith, hope, and love are an aspect of Christian discipleship,33 which 
itself is the formation of the soul to the image of Christ.34  As Aquinas main-
tained, these virtues are made available by the supernatural work of God in 
the life of the believer.35  Christians can of course develop them without par-
ticipating in government.  Yet, I would argue that government is an under-
appreciated sphere for the development and exercise of the theological virtues.  
The reason is simple: human government, though used by God, is imperfect.36  
Human judgment is beset by failures of will, knowledge, memory, and imag-
ination.  The best it may do is to approximate God’s judgment.  It is a stop-
gap for the time between the times of God’s uncontested reign.37  This is why 
Augustine’s judge wept: the tools of human judgment are insufficient to the 
task, and the judge knows it.38 
How does the Christian judge endure such suffering?  Perceiving human 
government, and our participation in it, as part of God’s plan for the world 
requires the exercise of faith.  Lawyers not only see but unavoidably contrib-
ute to judgment’s imperfection.  Can this imperfect human endeavor—gov-
ernment, with all its surfeit of lies, violence, and banal negligence—really be 
God’s servant for our good, as Paul asserted?  To see human judgment as such 
requires faith. 
To believe that God will one day judge our judgment, with perfect accu-
racy and mercy, requires hope.  Our mistaken judgment is not the last word.  
 
 33. 1 Corinthians 13:13. 
 34. Galatians 5:24, 6:14; Luke 9:23, 14:27; Mark 8:34; Matthew 10:38; Romans 8:30. 
 35. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 240 (questioning what virtues are made available by 
the work of God in the first part of question 62). 
 36. See Mark 10:42 (Jesus acknowledging that rulers were flawed). 
 37. See Titus 3:12. 
 38. See AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, supra note 4, at 926–28. 
[Vol. 47: 331, 2020] The Practice of Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
339 
Christ is the last word.  This is not an excuse for negligence or libertinism.  It 
is the assurance that God in Christ is busy making all things—including judg-
ment—new.39 
In the meantime, participating in judgment requires love for God, for 
those whom judgment protects, and for those whom it corrects.  This is where, 
in my view, mercy-as-forgiveness ought to enter the picture.  Christian law-
yers should be quick to let go of personal grievances, of course.  But more 
than this: they should urge their clients in civil cases to pursue reconciliation 
if at all possible.  The harder question for forgiveness is its role in criminal 
law.  My inclination is that prosecutors and judges should not take forgiveness 
into account because it is not theirs to give.  Victims may, of course, forgive.  
The harder question is whether and when society should forgive an offender, 
and how the legal system should implement such forgiveness. 
V. CONCLUSION: JUDGMENT AND DISCIPLESHIP 
I want to conclude by suggesting that participating in judgment is not only 
a unique way to exercise the spiritual virtues of faith, hope, and love, but also 
a unique way to develop them.  In short, enduring the “futility” of judgment 
with faith, hope, and love helps to conform lawyers into the image of Christ. 
Christians experience the imperfections of human judgment as part of the 
corruption of creation.  As Paul wrote to the Romans, “the creation was sub-
jected to futility” “in hope that the creation itself will be set free from its bond-
age to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God.”40  
“The whole creation has been groaning together in the pains of childbirth until 
now,” he says.41  This passage is ordinarily interpreted to be about the non-
human created order—the earth, animals, plants, and the like.  I would suggest 
that Paul’s sentiment applies equally to human government.  Though used by 
God, it is nonetheless subjected to “futility” and “the bondage of corrup-
tion.”42  Government is not only imperfect, but imperfectable, a frustrated 
tower to the sky. 
But the futility of creation is not the last word.  Paul connects it to disci-
pleship.  Those with the “first fruits of the Spirit . . . groan inwardly as we 
 
 39. 2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 6:15; Revelations 21:5. 
 40. Romans 8:20–21. 
 41. Id. at 8:22. 
 42. Id. at 8:21. 
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wait eagerly for adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies.”43  It is pre-
cisely because of our weakness, the gap between our vision and God’s, that 
the Spirit “intercedes for us with groanings too deep for words . . . according 
to the will of God.”44  “For,” as Paul reminds us, “those whom he foreknew 
he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.”45 
God uses the gulf between the way things are and the way things will be 
to transform us into the image of Christ.  It takes faith, hope, and love—gifts 
of God—to participate in the practice of law as a Christian.  And it is bound 
to be a trial—even putting aside the ordinary temptations of materialism, ca-
reerism, and power.  Even when a lawyer sees his or her work within God’s 
economy of creation and redemption, the government’s exercise of judgment 
is bound to be half-measured, inaccurate, and, at times, heart-breaking.  Yet 
God uses that trial to reinforce the spiritual virtues, making us more like 
Christ. 
And so perhaps Bob’s question, “Can the ordinary practice of law be a 
religious calling?” is best answered this way: God can use even the practice 
of law to make ordinary disciples. 
 
 43. Id. at 8:23. 
 44. Id. at 8:26–27. 
 45. Id. at 8:29. 
